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Abstract—Data provenance is a form of metadata that records the activities involved in data production. It can be used to help data
consumers to form judgments regarding data reliability. The PROV data model, released by the W3C in 2013, defines a relational
model and constraints which provides a structural and semantic foundation for provenance. This enables the exchange of provenance
between data producers and consumers. When the provenance content is sensitive and subject to disclosure restrictions, however, a
complementary model is needed to enable producers to partially obfuscate provenance in a principled way. In this paper we propose
such a formal model. It is embodied by a grouping operator, whereby a set of nodes in a PROV-compliant provenance graph is replaced
by a new abstract node, leading to a new valid PROV graph. We define graph editing rules which allow existing dependencies to be
removed, but guarantee that no spurious dependencies are introduced in the abstracted graph. As grouping is closed with respect to
composition, it can be used as a building block to achieve complex abstraction. The operator is implemented as part of a user tool that
lets owners of sensitive provenance information specify custom abstraction policies.
Index Terms—Provenance metadata, provenance abstraction
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The provenance of data is a form of structured metadata
that records the activities involved in data production.
In addition to activities, a provenance trace may include
input or intermediate data products, as well as references
to agents, humans as well as software systems, who were
responsible for carrying out those activities. In multi-
party collaborations settings that involve data sharing,
as well as in third party auditing of data and processes,
there is a broad expectation that shipping the available
provenance to collaborators, or more generally publish-
ing it along with the data may help data consumers
form judgments regarding the reliability of the data. The
recent standardisation of a data model for exchanging
provenance in an interoperable way, namely the PROV
model from the W3C [MMB+12], makes this assumption
realistic. With the emergence of provenance as a valuable
complement to data in such a setting, two separate but
related issues arise, namely of interpretation of complex
provenance, and of selective disclosure of potentially
sensitive provenance content.
First, regarding complexity we observe that while
provenance is a rich form of metadata, it is often the
reflection of articulated processes involving many inter-
mediate data products and many inter-related activities.
Such complexity is at odds with the need for humans
to understand traces, common for instance in e-science,
where provenance is perceived as an important element
of scholarly communication, and as such it needs to be
understood by non-technical users, i.e., scientists. Indeed
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in e-science, the idea of abstracting provenance to make
it understandable is not entirely new. The Zoom sys-
tem [BBDH08], discussed in more detail below, is an ex-
ample of a system for computing views over provenance,
which is designed to simplify human understanding of
provenance traces.
Second, regarding selective disclosure, we are motivated
by the emerging notion of dynamic coalitions [BFJM06].
These are ad hoc collaborative partnerships that are
created to pursue a common goal, in scenarios such as
multi-agency emergency / threat responses, as well as
exchange of intelligence information. Despite the need to
share data of a possibly sensitive nature, these coalitions
are characterized by a lack of established interaction
protocols and by limited trust amongst the partners. Our
working assumption is that, in this setting, provenance
can be used as a form of evidence in support of the data
that is being exchanged. In these scenarios, full disclo-
sure of provenance data may not be possible, e.g. due
either to confidentiality policies, Intellectual Property
restrictions associated with individual components, or
data protection regulations. These restrictions introduce
the need to hide certain parts of the provenance traces.
In this paper we develop a model and algorithm for
performing abstraction over provenance metadata. These
provide the theoretical underpinning, defined on top of
PROV, for applications that require provenance exchange
while obfuscating some of its content.
1.1 Example scenario: provenance of intelligence
information
Imagine a setting where one or more public agencies
engage in a business relationship with an independent
intelligence provider. In Fig. 1 these are the Public
Agencies (PA) box and the Incident Room Analysts (IR)
box, respectively. IR has a business incentive to provide
2Fig. 1. Simple two-way partnership involving one sender
(IR) and one receiver (PA)
analysis of potential threats to PA that is as accurate
as possible, while PA has an interest in acquiring and
acting upon intelligence reports issued by IR. Realisti-
cally, however, PA will want to mitigate the risk of acting
upon information provided by IR, which is potentially
unreliable. At the same time, IR has a business incentive
to supply PA with additional evidence that facilitates
PA’s risk assessment.
The key assumption that motivates our work is that
the provenance of the intelligence report is relevant in
contributing, at least in part, the needed evidence. This
may contain a wealth of details regarding how the report
was produced, including the raw input data used for the
analysis, the analytical tools and their configuration pa-
rameters, as well as the identity of the analysts involved,
and their position within the business organization.
An example of provenance containing such informa-
tion is shown in Fig. 2. As depicted in the figure,
provenance can be represented as a graph whose nodes
represent either entites (ovals in the figure), i.e., data,
documents, etc., activities (rectangles), which represent
the execution of some process over a period of time, or
entites (pentagons), which represent humans or comput-
ing systems. Directed edges represent various types of
relationships, the most common being “activity a used
entity e”, “entity e was generated by activity a”, “activity
a was associated with agent ag” (i.e., ag was responsible
for a), and more. Provenance graphs are introduced more
formally in Sec. 3.
While both IR and PA are interested in sending and
receiving such provenance information, some of it may
be sensitive and proprietary. Input datasets may include
a combination of public social media streams, shown in
the figure, and private databases. Likewise, analytical
tools may include proprietary algorithms. In a setting
where mutual trust is limited, the contrast between the
need to exchange provenance as a form of evidence on
one side, and the need to protect confidential informa-
tion that can be found in the provenance on the other,
generates a tension amongst the partners.
We believe that such tension can be resolved by pro-
viding IR, the provenance owner, with ways to control the
disclosure of provenance to third parties. This consists
of (i) a model of abstraction over provenance, whereby
some of its elements are grouped together and replaced
with a new, abstract element, and (ii) a policy model that
the provenance owner can use to specify the elements
which are to be abstracted.
1.2 Contribution: graph abstraction by node group-
ing
The work presented here is focused exclusively on (i),
while (ii) is the subject of a separate upcoming report,
focused on a user tool for the specification and enforce-
ment of provenance abstraction policies. For complete-
ness, however, we provide a brief overview of the tool
in Sec. 6, and an example of an abstraction policy in the
Appendix.
Removal of information from a provenance graph
can be achieved in a number of ways. First, one could
simply remove the labels as well as the annotations from
invidual nodes and relationships, i.e., anonymize part of
the graph. Second, nodes and relationships can be re-
moved from the graph. This will reduce the information
available, and may even break the graph into two or
more unconnected subcomponents. For example, remov-
ing nodes consolidateAJC and consolidateBNC in
the graph of Fig. 2 would create two unconnected sub-
components, although the resulting subgraphs are still
valid.
Both these options are straightforward and are not
discussed further in the paper. Neither, however, reduce
the complexity of the graph (arguably, node removal
may in fact make the resulting incomplete provenance
harder to understand and analyze). The mechanism pre-
sented here instead involves a new grouping operator,
whereby a user-selected set of nodes is replaced by a
single abstract node, and connectivity is guaranteed by
replacing some of the relationships amongst those nodes
with new ones that involve the new abstract node, in
a way that guarantees that no false dependencies are
introduced.
Our specific contribution in the remainder of the paper
is the formal definition of the grouping operator, first
with reference to graphs containing only entities and
activities, and then extended to graphs with agents.
Using examples to justify our formal choices, we define
functions that achieve grouping by rewriting the original
graph into a new, abstracted graph, and show that the
rewriting maps preserves the validity of the original
graph, i.e., the validity of the PROV typing constraints.
1.3 Compliance to PROV
We view abstraction as a form of graph rewriting. Con-
ceptually, two approaches can be taken when defin-
ing the rewriting rules. One option is to extend the
PROV model with additional elements (for instance, new
types to denote abstract nodes) and a corresponding
system of constraints, resulting in an extension PROV’
of PROV. In this setting, a legal rewriting is one that
transforms a valid PROV graph PG into a valid PROV’
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Fig. 2. Example provenance graph for the reference scenario (Fig. 1)
graph PG′, where validity is interpreted as conformance
to the PROV’ schema. While this approach leads to
the definition of a new and possibly interesting model
for abstract provenance, the interoperability guarantees
provided from having standardized PROV would be
compromised.
A second option, which we take here, is to define
a rewriting that generates a PROV-compliant graph.
Should additional metadata describing the abstract na-
ture of the some of elements of the final graph PG′
be required — and more generally, the provenance of
PG′ relative to the transformation — this can be itself
expressed using PROV, and associated to PG′ using
PROV’s “provenance of provenance” mechanism (i.e.,
bundles [MMB+12]). By taking this approach, interop-
erability is preserved by expressing abstraction as part
of PROV itself. Considering the role of provenance as ev-
idence for the process of data production, in addition to
defining validity-preserving rewritings we also require
that no false or “spurious” relationships be introduced
by the rewriting. For instance, if a and e are unrelated
in PG, it would be illegal to add a new relationship
between them, although this will not violate validity
with respect to the schema. Application of this principle
requires some care when either of these nodes is replaced
by an abstract node, as in this case a new relationship
involving the abstract node may be legitimate. These
situations are discussed as part of our formalization in
Sec. 4.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Abstraction over provenance
Work on provenance abstraction generally combines two
elements, namely a technique or algorithm for graph
editing, and a policy framework to drive the algorithm.
As mentioned, in this paper we focus exclusively on the
former, while the latter is described in a separate demo
paper.
Regarding transforming provenance graphs for the
purpose of either reducing their complexity, and/or re-
moving sensitive information, several approaches stand
out. The first is the Zoom system [BBDH08], designed
to compute views over provenance graphs. Its main
assumption is that the graph is a trace that specifically
represents the execution of a dataflow. This is a common
occurrence in e-science, where workflows that follow the
dataflow model are a popular high level programming
paradigm. In this setting views over provenance are
effectively a form of abstraction and are computed based
on the user’s indication of which workflow modules
(tasks) are relevant, or perhaps based on which modules
the user has access to. Thus, key to this approach is
knowledge of the underlying workflow structure, which
is used to specify the nodes in the graphs to be ab-
stracted. This sets Zoom apart from our work, which
instead investigates the properties of a grouping opera-
tor independently of the origins of the trace to which it
is applied.
Also specific to workflow-generated provenance, and
thus too narrow in scope for our purposes, is a strand of
research that investigates the problem of preserving the
privacy of functions used in workflows, when a large
number of input/output pairs for those functions is re-
4vealed through the provenance traces of multiple work-
flow executions. This work on module privacy [DKR+11],
[DKRB10], [DKM+11] is concerned with protecting the
semantics of workflow modules. It applies anonymiza-
tion techniques specifically to provenance graphs and
is again centred around a workflow-specific form of
provenance and is thus also peripheral to our interest.
Closer to our abstraction model, both in motiva-
tion and in its technical approach, is the ProPub sys-
tem [DZL11], which computes views over provenance
graphs that are suitable for publication by meeting
certain privacy requirements. In ProPub, users spec-
ify edit operations on a graph, such as anonymizing,
abstracting, and hiding certain parts of it. The opera-
tions are specified as logic rules, and are interpreted
natively by the Datalog-based prototype implementa-
tion. ProPub adopts an “apply–detect–repair” approach,
whereby user rules are applied to the graph first, then
consistency violations that may occur in the resulting
new graph are detected, and a final set of edits are
applied to the graph in order to repair such violations.
In some cases, this causes nodes that the user wanted
removed to be reintroduced, and it is not always possible
to satisfy all rules. In contrast, our grouping involves
more simply a set of nodes to be abstracted (but note
that anonymization is a particular case, when the group
contains a single element). In return for this simplicity in
the specification of the nodes to be grouped, our method
always produces a valid abstract graph while ensuring
that the nodes specified in the policy are removed.
Finally, recent work on provenance redaction [CKKT11b]
employs a graph grammar technique to edit prove-
nance that is expressed using the Open Provenance
Model [MCF+11] (a precursor to PROV), as well as a
redaction policy language. Although the authors claim
that the redaction operators ensure that specific relation-
ships are preserved, this critical issue is not addressed
formally in the paper, i.e., with reference to the OPM
semantics. In contrast, the formal schema and set of
constraints that come with PROV [MMB+12], [CMM12]
provide the necessary grounding for reasoning about
the validity-preservation properties of the editing oper-
ations.
2.2 General graph anonymization
For completeness, we briefly mention more general tech-
niques for graph editing, largely motivated by the need
to preserve privacy in social network data. This body
of work, which is not specific to provenance, extends
the well-known data anynomization framework devel-
oped for relational data to graph data structures [ZG08],
[BCKS09], [LT08]. The main idea is to randomly remove
arcs between two nodes and replace them with new
ones. As arcs in PROV graphs represent relationships
with a given semantics, this approach generally results
in false dependencies being created in the edited graph,
and is therefore not viable. The main value of this body
of work in this setting, as summarised in [ZPL08], is to
ensure that various forms of anonymization are provably
robust to attacks from adversaries who can potentially
leverage their partial information about fragments of the
graph, to infer additional knowledge. In this paper we
do not discuss the robustness of abstraction by grouping,
indeed we do not consider any specific threats, and so
the challenge of preventing the reconstruction of the
abstracted fragments of provenance graphs is left for
future work.
2.3 Provenance Access Control
Most of the work on protecting access to sensitive prove-
nance includes policy models that extend traditional
data access control frameworks (RBAC), with a dis-
tinction made between PBAC (Provenance-Based Access
Control) and PAC (Provenance Access Control). PBAC is
about policy to specify access rights to data objects based
on their provenance. An example, from [NPS12], is a rule
of the form “only the student submitter can access the
graded homework object”. This rule can be enforced by
looking for a dependency path in a provenance graph,
whereby a given homework is attributed to a specific
student (i.e., relation IsAuthoredBy in the Open Prove-
nance Model). This assumes that the object’s attribution
is explicit in the provenance graph. It is less clear how
such a rule would be evaluated when the provenance is
incomplete with respect to such attribution dependency,
however.
PAC, or how to enforce access control on parts of a
provenance graph, is more directly relevant to our work.
An analysis of some of the challenges associated with
secure provenance exchange can be found in [BSS08],
where examples are presented that show how the prove-
nance of data can be more sensitive than the data
itself. Another position paper [HSW07] describes the
challenges associated with the exchange of provenance
across multiple partners, in a setting where forgery of
provenance by malicious users is a possibility, and where
users may collude to reveal sensitive provenance to
others. These are all common and complex security prob-
lems. Unfortunately, the paper stops short of providing
any hints at technical solutions, and indeed it is not
clear how these problems are specific to provenance, as
opposed to data sharing in general.
A concrete specification of an access control system
or provenance [CKKT11a] consists of a XACML-based
policy language, in which path queries are used to
specify target elements of the graph, as well as an
implementation architecture and a prototype.
3 CORE PROV MODEL
We now introduce the core elements of the PROV model,
which forms the basis for the grouping operator. We
maintain a dual view of provenance, both as a relational
model (with binary relations) and as a graph model.
Viewed as a relational model, PROV includes three types
5Fig. 3. Core elements of the PROV model,
from [MMB+12]
of entities: Entities (En), Activities (Act), and Agents
(Ag), and several types of relations amongst them. In
line with the description in [MMB+12] (sec. 2), PROV is
defined by the following core relations.
used ⊆ Act× En
genBy ⊆ En×Act
wasDerivedFrom ⊆ En× En
inval ⊆ En×Act
waw ⊆ Act×Ag
abo ⊆ Ag ×Ag
wat ⊆ En×Ag
wasInformedBy ⊆ Act×Act
These are summarized in Fig. 3. Initially, we are going
to restrict ourselves to an even simpler model, consisting
only of En, Act, and relations used and genBy. Agents
and the relations that involve them are introduced in
Sec. 5. Further extensions to the additional relations —
wasDerivedFrom and wasInformedBy — are straight-
forward and are not considered in detail due to space
constraints.
An instance I of the model consists of sets en ∈ En
and act ∈ Act of symbols, and sets of relation instances
{genBy(e, a) | e ∈ En, a ∈ Act} ∪ {used(a, e) | e ∈ En, a ∈
Act}.
As these relations are binary, we can view I as a
digraph G = (V,E), where V = En ∪ Act, and each
relation instance maps to a labelled directed edge. By
convention, we orient these edges from right to left, to
denote that the relation “points back to the past”. Thus:
a genBy←−−−− e ∈ E iff genBy(e, a) ∈ I, and e used←−−− a ∈ E
iff used(a, e) ∈ I. We denote the label associated to edge
(vi, vj) as label(vi, vj).
Note that, by definition of the relations, G is a bipartite
graph. We denote the set of all such graphs by PGgu/ea,
to indicate that they only contain En and Act nodes, and
genBy and used edges. In Sec. 5 we are going to extend
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
e7
e8
a1
a3
a2
a4
used
used used
used
used
wgBy
wgBy
wgBy
wgBy
Fig. 4. PGgu/ea provenance graph used as a running
example to illustrate abstraction by grouping
this set to include agents as well as additional relations.
Fig. 4 portrays a simple PGgu/ea graph that we will be
using as a running example.
3.1 PGgu/ea constraints
The PROV-CONSTR specification document [CMM12]
defines two main types of constraints, namely type
constraints and temporal constraints. The former specify
the domain and range of relationships amongst en-
tities, activities, and agents. For instance, “a used e”
is a valid relation if and only if e is an entity node
and a is an activity node. These constraints are listed
in [CMM12] (see Sec. 6.3, Constraint 50 (typing)) and
are summarized by the schema definitions above. Ad-
ditionally, constraint entity-activity-disjoint (Constraint
55) in [CMM12] stipulates that entities and activities be
disjoint: En ∩Act = ∅..
Temporal constraints rely on a set of pre-defined tem-
poral events, which are used to mark the start and end
of an activity, the start of entity usage, the end of entity
generation, and more. An example of constraints in this
class is the following: “given two events ev1, ev2 which
mark the start and end of a, respectively, then any event
ev which marks the usage of e by a cannot temporally
precede ev1 or follow ev2.”
A valid PROV graph is one that satisfies all the ap-
plicable constraints. Although both these types of con-
straints are an integral part of the definition of validity
of a provenance graph, in this work we are going to
focus exclusively on type constraints to define validity.
The implications of the grouping operator on temporal
events, and thus the preservation of the corresponding
constraints, is the subject of related but separate work.
4 GROUPING PROVENANCE GRAPH NODES
As mentioned in Sec. 1.2, our goal is to define graph
editing operators that selectively remove information
from a graph G ∈ PGgu/ea, yielding a new graph
G′ ∈ PGgu/ea. The first of these, namely the removal
of labels or annotations associated with a node or an
edge, is straightforward. Regarding the removal of a
node, we note that simply reconnecting the remaining
nodes generally may lead to an invalid graph. A simple
example is a graph defined by: {used(a, e1), genBy(e2, a)}
6where activity a is removed. This results simply in two
disconnected nodes e1, e2, because no relationship can
be inferred between them from the original graph.
Rather than delving into the possible consequences
of such node and edge elision, we are going to focus
exclusively on the Group graph transformation operator
as the prime way to achieve abstraction over provenance
graphs. Group takes a graph G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea and
a subset Vgr ⊂ V of its nodes and produces a modified
graph G′ ∈ PGgu/ea. The nodes in Vgr are “grouped”
together and replaced by a new single node.
Group : PGgu/ea × P(V)→ PGgu/ea
As the operator is closed under composition, further
abstraction can be achieved by repeated grouping, either
on multiple disjoint sets Vgr, or on sets that include
abstract nodes (abstraction of abstraction).
To get a quick intuition of the problems faced in
the definition of the grouping operator, consider the
transformation in Fig. 5, where nodes Vgr = {e1, e3, e4, e5}
are simply replaced with new node e′ in the example
graph of Fig. 4, and all edges in and out of nodes in Vgr
are just “rewired” in and out of e′.
This naive replacement leads to problems. Firstly, it
introduces two cycles: e′ ↔ a1 and e′ ↔ a3. Furthermore,
the two edges e′ ← a1 and e′ ← a3 cannot be of type
genBy, while at the same time one cannot arbitrarily
introduce used relations, which would be false depen-
dencies. Thus, the resulting graph is not a valid PROV
graph. Note that the former of these problems had been
already pointed out in the description of the ProPub
system [DZL11], mentioned above.
4.1 Closure and homogeneous grouping
The example suggests that the cycle is caused by nodes
a1 and a3, which both lie on the paths between two of
the nodes in Vgr. Intuitively, set Vgr is not “convex”, that
is, there are paths in G that lead out of Vgr and then
back in again. This observation suggests the introduction
of a preliminary closure operation, aimed at ensuring
acyclicity. This is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Path Closure): Let G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea
be a provenance graph, and let Vgr ⊂ V. For each pair
vi, vj ∈ Vgr such that there is a directed path vi ; vj in G,
let Vij ⊂ V be the set of all nodes in the path. The Path
Closure of Vgr in G is
pclos(Vgr,V) =
⋃
vi,vj∈Vgr Vij
Fig. 6(b) shows a continuation of the previous ex-
ample. This time the replacement is performed on
pclos({e1, e3, e4, e5},G) = {e1, e3, e4, e5, a1, a3}, resulting in
graph (c). However, while this solves the cycle problem,
the graph is no longer bipartite, due to the new edges
e′ → e2 and e′ → e6, which connect nodes of the same
type. In this example, we can construct a new group
of nodes, {e′, e2, e6}, on the graph that results from the
first replacement, and replace it with a new node e′′. The
resulting graph (d) is a valid PGgu/ea graph.
The same result can be obtained by first extending the
closure in (b) to include e-nodes e2, e6, and then replacing
the resulting set with e′′ (this is indicated by the “extend
and replace” arrow from (b) to (d) shown in the figure).
Following this approach, we are going to define group-
ing as a composition of three functions: closure, defined
above, extension, and replacement, as follows.
The extension of a set Vgr ⊂ V relative to type t ∈
{En,Act} is Vgr augmented with all its adjacent nodes,
in either direction, of type t. Formally:
Definition 2 (extend): Let G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea, t ∈
{En,Act}.
extend(Vgr,G, t) =
Vgr ∪
{v′ | (v, v′) ∈ E ∧ v ∈ Vgr ∧ type(v′) = t)} ∪
{v | (v′, v) ∈ E ∧ v ∈ Vgr ∧ type(v′) = t)}
In our example, extend({e1, e3, e4, e5, a1, a3},G, En) =
{e1, e3, e4, e5, a1, a3, e2, e6}. Note that all sink nodes in
extend(Vgr,G, t) are of type t by construction.
Next, we consider replacement. Let G = (V,E), V′gr ⊂
V be obtained using extend, and let vnew be a new node
symbol that does not appear in V. Function replace
replaces V′ with vnew in V, and connects vnew to the rest
of the graph, as follows.
Let ϑout(V′gr) denote the outcut of G associated with
V′gr:
ϑout(V′gr) = {(v, v′) | v ∈ Vgr′ , v′ ∈ V \ Vgr}
This is the set of arcs of G leading out of V′gr, i.e., whose
heads lie in V′gr and whose tails lie in V \ V′gr. Symmet-
rically, let ϑin(V′gr) denote the incut of G associated with
V′gr, i.e., the set of arcs of G leading into V′gr:
ϑin(V′gr) = {(v, v′) | v′ ∈ Vgr′ , v ∈ V \ Vgr}
Finally, let ϑint(V′gr) = {(v1, v2) ∈ E | v1, v2 ∈ V′gr} denote
the arcs that connect nodes in V′gr:
ϑint(V′gr) = {(v, v′) | v, v′ ∈ Vgr′}
Function replace replaces each arc (v′, v) ∈ ϑout(V′gr)
with a new arc (vnew, v) of the same type, and replaces
each arc (v, v′) ∈ ϑin(V′gr) with a new arc (v, vnew) of the
same type. Arcs in ϑint(V′gr) simply disappear along with
the nodes in V′gr. It is easy to verify that the resulting
graph is type-correct. Indeed, all sink nodes in V′gr are
of type t as noted above, and so is vnew by construction.
Thus, sink nodes are replaced by a node vnew of the same
type. Since the arcs have the same type as those they
replace, it follows that replace preserves type correctness.
Formally, let:
Definition 3:
ϑ′out(V
′
gr) = {v t←− vnew | v t←− v′ ∈ ϑout(V′gr)}
ϑ′in(V
′
gr) = {vnew t←− v | v′ t←− v ∈ ϑin(V′gr)}
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Fig. 6. Path Closure and replacement with extension on a set of Entity nodes.
Definition 4 (Replace):
replace(Vgr, vnew,G) = (V′,E′), where:
V′ = V \ Vgr ∪ {vnew}
E′ = E \ (ϑout(Vgr) ∪ ϑin(Vgr) ∪ ϑint(Vgr))
∪ϑ′out(Vgr) ∪ ϑ′in(Vgr)
We can now provide an initial definition of our Group
operator, under the simplifying assumption that all
nodes in Vgr are of the same type, either En or Act,
which we denote by type(Vgr) (with a slight abuse of
notation). Fig. 7 shows a progression similar to that of
Fig. 6, but this time type(v) = Act for each v ∈ Vgr =
{a1, a2, a3}, and Vgr is replaced by another activity node,
a′. Under assumption of type homogeneity, the grouping
operator is a functional composition of pclos, extend, and
replace functions, defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Homogeneous Grouping): Let G = (V,E) ∈
PGgu/ea, Vgr ∈ V be a type-homogeneous set, and let vnew
be a new node with type(vnew = type(Vgr).
Grouphom(G,Vgr, vnew) =
replace(
extend(
pclos(Vgr,V),V, type(Vgr)), vnew,G)
As an illustration, in our running example we have:
Vgr = {e1, e3, e4, e5}
Vcl = pclos(Vgr,G) = {e1, e3, e4, e5, a1, a3}
V′ = extend(Vcl, En) = Vcl ∪ {e2, e6}
Groupe(G,Vgr, vnew) = replace(V
′, vnew,G)
= ({e′′}, {(a2, e′′), (a4, e′′)})
4.2 Generalization to e-grouping and a-grouping
So far we have considered grouping over sets Vgr of type-
homogeneous nodes (before closure). Additional care
must be taken if we allow Vgr to include nodes of mixed
types. First, the type of the replacement node must now
be specified, as it is no longer implied from the type of
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Fig. 7. Grouping on a set of Activity nodes
the nodes in Vgr. Indeed, the choice of such type leads
to different abstracted graphs. Thus, we will now refer
to grouping as t-grouping, where t ∈ {En,Act}, i.e., e-
grouping or a-grouping. Fig. 8(a-1, a-2) illustrates the
application of the Grouphom operator (Def. 5), assuming
a-grouping and Vgr = {e4, a2}. Note that the extension
incorporates Activity node a1.
Second, observe that a new pattern arises in the case of
e-grouping as shown in Fig. 8(e-1, e-2). Now the extension
leads to Vcl = Vgr ∪ {e5}, which in turn leads to the
pattern shown in Fig. 8(e-3), involving two generation
events for the new entity eN.
Although this is a valid pattern, the two generation
events must be simultaneous (this is one of the temporal
constraints defined in [CMM12]):
ev(genBy(eN, a1))  ev(genBy(eN, a2)) ∧
ev(genBy(eN, a2))  ev(genBy(eN, a1))
The intuitive interpretation for this pattern is that each
of the two activities generated one entity in the group
represented by eN, and that the abstraction makes these
two events indistinguishable. Formally, nothing further
needs to be done to the graph. However note that one
can restore, if desired, the more natural pattern whereby
one single generation event is recorded for eN. This is
achieved simply by propagating the grouping to the set
of generating activities. In the example, this leads to the
graph in Fig. 8(e-3).
We now formalize these considerations by introducing
two definitions for Group. The first, which we call t-
grouping, is agnostic of multiple generation patterns,
while the second (strict t-grouping) applies propagation
to ensure that the graph is free from multiple generation
patterns.
Definition 6 (t-Grouping): Let G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea,
Vgr ∈ V, t ∈ {En,Act}, and let vnew be a new node with
type(vnew) = t. Then:
Group(G,Vgr, vnew, t) =
replace(extend(pclos(Vgr,V),V, t), vnew,G)
Note that the assumption that sink nodes in the clo-
sure are homogeneous and are replaced by a node of the
same type t, which is necessary for replace to perform
correctly, still holds in this case.
Definition 7 (Strict t-Grouping): Given G = (V,E) ∈
PGgu/ea, Vgr ∈ V, t ∈ {En,Act}, and a new node vnew
with type(vnew) = t, let
G′ = (V′,E′) = Group(G,Vgr, vnew, t).
Let Vgen = {a ∈ V′ | a genBy←−−−− vnew ∈ E′} be the set of
Activity nodes that generate vnew according to G′, and
let anew be a new activity node. Then:
Groupstr(G,Vgr, vnew, t) =
{
G′ if |Vgen |≤ 1
replace(Vgen, anew,G′) otherwise
It is straightforward to show that strict t-grouping
reduces to normal grouping if the grouping is a homo-
geneous a-grouping:
if type(t) = Act
then Groupstr(G,Vgr, t) = Group(G,Vgr, t).
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5 ABSTRACTION WITH AGENTS
Having laid the foundations for abstraction on the core
PGgu/ea model, extending grouping to a model that also
includes agents, the third pillar or the PROV model,
is quite straightforward. Agents may be humans or
software systems. Specifically, we now consider the node
type Ag and the following additional relation types from
the PROV schema of Sec. 3:
waw ⊆ Act×Ag
wat ⊆ En×Ag
abo ⊆ Ag ×Ag
We use the shorthand relation names waw, wat and abo
for wasAssociatedWith, wasAttributedTo and actedOnBe-
halfOf. These denote responsibility of an agent for an
activity (waw), responsibility of an agent for an entity
(wat), and delegation between two agents (abo).
Note that PROV admits an additional optional activity
element to abo, which is used to qualify the delegation as
occurring within the scope of that activity. For simplicity,
we are not going to consider this qualified version of
the relation. Thus, we can still assume that these new
relations are binary, and so we continue to view an
instance of a provenance graph as a digraph G = (V,E),
where new V = En ∪ Act ∪ Ag, and where each relation
instance maps to a labelled directed edge. We denote the
set of all such graphs as PGgu+/eaAg.
The main implications of adding agents to our ab-
straction model are that (i) a new ag-grouping operator
must be introduced, and (ii) the existing definitions of
e-grouping and a-grouping must be modified slightly.
In order to incorporate agents into the definition of
Group, observe that, for all three relations involving
agents, the agent node is always the target of the directed
edge. This means that agents can be viewed as part of an
“outer layer” in the provenance graph. This is illustrated
in Fig. 9, where the agents are shown in bold lines in the
outer side of the digraph.
This observation suggests we can break down the
analysis of grouping with agents into the following three
parts.
1) Vgr ⊂ Ag. This is the case for ag-grouping, which
only involves the outer layer of the graph. Since
agents are only related to each other through del-
egation: abo(ag1, ag2), grouping in this case is akin
to homogeneous grouping from Sec. 4.1, i.e., no nodes
of other types are ever involved, and vnew ∈ Ag.
2) Vgr ⊂ En ∪ Act as in Sec. 4. This is the case of t-
grouping (Def. 6), where the nodes involved in the
abstraction are in the inner layer, but they may be
related to agent nodes via waw and wat relations.
3) Vgr ⊂ En ∪ Act ∪ Ag. Here, the group set may
contain any combination of nodes. However, the
peripheral role played by agents relative to entities
and activities suggests that it may be reasonable to
restrict this case to e-grouping or a-grouping, i.e., a
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combination of node types may include agents, but
it should not be abstracted by a new agent node.
5.1 Ag-grouping: abstracting agents
We begin with the case where abstraction is performed
over a set of agents, i.e., Vgr ⊂ Ag. In this case, the exist-
ing definition of t-grouping (Def. 6) extends naturally to
PGgu+/eaAg graphs. T-grouping involves three operators:
pclos, extend, and replace. Since pclos(Vgr,V) operates
only on abo relations, it follows that its result is also
homogeneous, i.e., pclos(Vgr,V) ⊂ Ag. Also, there is no
need to restore type validity by extending the closure,
i.e., extend is the identity: extend(pclos(Vgr,V),V, Ag) =
pclos(Vgr,V). Finally, it is easy to see that our original
definition of group replace (Def. 4) is general enough to
accommodate the “rewiring” of the new abstract agent
node. We illustrate this informally using the patterns of
Fig. 10.
In pattern (a), Vgr = {ag1, ag4}, and pclos(Vgr,V) =
{ag1, ag2, ag3, ag4}. In this case, the closure includes all
the intermediate agents in the delegation chain between
ag1 and ag4. Replacement trivially transforms G into the
single abstract agent agN.
In pattern (b), Vgr = {ag2, ag5, ag4}. Note that not
all agent nodes in Vgr are related, either directly or
through a path. This is not a problem, as we have
Vclos = pclos(Vgr,V) = {ag2, ag5, ag4, ag3}. Replacement
applies as follows, where ϑint(Vclos) is the set of relations
beginning and ending inside Vclos:
ϑint(Vclos) = {abo(ag2, ag3), abo(ag3, ag5)}
ϑin(Vclos) = {wat(e, ag2), abo(ag1, ag4)}
ϑout(Vclos) = {abo(ag4, ag6)}
Thus, replace(Vclos, agN,G) maps relations in the orig-
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Fig. 10. ag-grouping involving delegation.
inal graph to those in the abstracted graph as follows:
abo(ag4, ag6) → abo(agN, ag6)
wat(e, ag2) → wat(e, agN)
abo(ag1, ag4) → abo(ag1, agN)
In practice, replacement preserves agents ag1 and ag6
and restores their delegation relations relative to the
new abstract agent, agN. It also maps relation wat(e, ag2),
which involves the untouched e node, to a new relation
of the same type: wat(e, agN).
We conclude that, in this first case, Def. 5 applies
without changes.
5.2 a-grouping and e-grouping with agents
The second case, where Vgr ⊂ En ∪ Act, is t-grouping
with added agents relations. Here the replace operator
(Def. 4) must now consider how edges that involve
agents are mapped to new edges in the abstract graph.
We have already observed that agent nodes are always
the targets of directed edges. It follows that the closure
of a set of nodes Vgr ⊂ En∪Act never adds agent nodes
to Vgr, because this would require the added agent to
be on a path between two nodes from En ∪ Act, and
therefore to be the source of a directed edge.
A second observation is that if waw(a, ag) holds, and
a is involved in a-grouping, then a is replaced by anew,
and thus waw(anew, ag) also holds (Fig. 11(a1)). Simi-
larly for e-grouping, if wat(e, ag) holds, and e is in-
volved in e-grouping, then e is replaced by enew, and
wat(enew, ag) holds (Fig. 11(b1)). On the other hand,
suppose waw(a, ag) holds and e-grouping is performed.
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A simple case is shown in Fig. 11(c1). In this case, a is
replaced by enew ∈ En, therefore waw(enew, ag) is type-
incorrect. Similarly, wat(e, ag) after a-grouping would
become, incorrectly, wat(anew, ag). These two patterns are
summarised in Fig. 11(a2, b2 resp.). Note that one cannot
simply replace association with attribution, i.e., replace
relation waw(a, ag) with wat(eN, ag), because there is no
guarantee that any of the entities represented by the
new eN had been attributed to ag in the original graph.
Similarly, one cannot replace wat(e, ag) with waw(aN, ag).
Instead, in pattern (a) we simply remove the incorrect
waw relations following e-grouping, and similarly, in
pattern (b) we remove the incorrect wat relations fol-
lowing a-grouping.
These considerations suggest that the definition of
the replace function for grouping needs to be adapted
for the case where agents are involved. To understand
why, recall from Sec. 4.1 that replace replaces a type-
homogeneous set, computed by the extend function,
with an abstract node of the same type. An extension
of type t augments the closure of a grouping set by
adding all adjacent nodes of the same type to it. This
ensures that replacing the nodes in the extension with
an abstract node of the same type preserves the type
correctness of the relations. However it should be clear
from the example above (parts c1, c2 of the figure), that
both e-grouping and a-grouping on the set Vgr = {a, e}
result in one of the two agent relations being incorrect.
Intuitively, this is because the extension function fails to
incorporate agents, leaving the agent relations exposed
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Fig. 12. e-grouping leads to incorrect abo relation when
agents are part of a closure.
on the outcut of Vgr (in fact, extend in this example does
nothing at all).
The pattern in (c2) (or its symmetric, for a-grouping),
can be obtained simply by ensuring that replace deletes
the incorrect relations. The following variation on Defi-
nition 3 ensures these deletions are enforced.
ϑ′out(V
′
gr) = {v t←− vnew | v t←− v′ ∈ ϑout(V′gr)∧
((t = wat ∧ type(vnew) = En)∨
(t = waw ∧ type(vnew) = Act)∨
(t 6= wat ∧ t 6= waw))}
5.3 The general case: grouping on any node type
The third and more general case, where
Vgr ⊂ En ∪ Act ∪ Ag, presents one further difficulty.
Consider performing e-grouping on the pattern
of Fig. 12 (left), with Vgr = {e4, ag5}. We have
pclos(Vgr) = {e4, ag5, ag3}, resulting in the abstraction
on the right. Clearly, the former abo(ag4, ag3) relation
should not be mapped in the final graph. This issue
arises because there the extension function, which
guarantees type consistency for e- and a-nodes, does
not include agents.
Once again we deal with the issue by changing the
definition of replace to ensure that the incorrect relation
is not mapped. Note that a change is required to ϑ′in(V
′
gr)
rather than ϑ′out(V′gr) as in the previous case. The new
definition is as follows.
ϑ′in(V
′
gr) = {vnew t←− v | v′ t←− v ∈ ϑin(V′gr)
∧ ((t = abo ∧ type(vnew) = Ag) ∨ t 6= abo)}
Thus, a delegation relation is mapped in the abstract
graph only if the target abstract node is an agent.
With the new version of the replace function, intro-
duced in the previous two sections, some of the relations
in the original graph G are not mapped to the abstracted
graph G′. This makes it possible for some of the nodes
in G′ to end up disconnected from the rest of the
graph. As an example, the graph in Fig. 13 shows the
result of e-grouping over the shaded nodes in the graph
of Fig. 9. The combination of closure, extensions and
replacement results in ag5 being isolated, or “orphaned”
in the abstract graph.
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As isolated agent nodes may not be significant to
consumers of the abstracted graphs, for completeness we
provide a simple function to optionally remove them at
the end of the abstraction process, as follows.
Definition 8 (Removing isolated agents): Let
G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu+/eaAg, and
isolated(G) = {v ∈ V | type(v) = Ag
∧ @v′ ∈ V.((v′, v) ∈ E ∨ (v, v′) ∈ E)}
Then:
remIsolated((V,E)) = (V \ isolated(G),E)
6 SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Rather than giving a procedural pseudo-code for the
Group algorithm, we summarize its functional speci-
fication, comprising of the four functions defined so
far: pclos(), extend(), replace(), and remIsolated(), in
Table 1.
A procedural implementation of the algorithm, writ-
ten in Java, is available online (https://github.com/
PaoloMissier/ProvAbs) as part of a tool in which a pol-
icy language is used to drive the selection of the set Vgr of
nodes to be abstracted. Using the tool, policy setters may
experiment with abstraction policies on their provenance
graphs, observing their effects when abstraction is per-
formed. Noting that Group() is closed wrt composition,
the tool also allows for more complex abstraction, by
letting users specify compositions of Group operations as
part of their policy. The tool is described in more detail
in a separate submission [MBG13]. An example of policy
is given in the Appendix.
The work described in this paper is progressing in two
main directions. First, we are aware that the fragment
of PROV to which this version of Group applies does
not cover all relation types. Nevertheless, the method
described in the paper for reasoning about PROV graph
transformation can be used as a guideline to extend the
work to the missing parts of PROV. We are going to
address these in the future.
Second, so far we have ignored the implications of
abstraction on the space of events that are used to
characterize the semantics of PROV. As constraints over
the relative ordering of events are defined in detail in the
PROV-CONSTR document, there is however an obliga-
tion to extend the notion of validity of PROV graphs to
include those constraints. Thus, grouping must be shown
to be validity-preserving relative to those constraints as
well.
APPENDIX
OVERVIEW OF POLICY MODEL AND TOOL FOR
ABSTRACTION
The tool alluded to in the previous section operates on
provenance graphs written in the provenance notation
PROV-N [MMCSR12].
Given G ∈ PGgu+/eaAg, the tool lets users specify
a grouping set Vgr by means of an abstraction policy.
It operates in two steps. Firstly, path expressions and
predicates are used to select a set of nodes, and to
assign a numerical sensitivity value to them. For example,
the following rule contains a path expression that binds
variables process and data to activity and entity nodes
a, e, respectively, such that used(a, e) holds and e is any
node that is reachable from node with id d14:
for all (process used data)
where (data descendantOf d14))
setSensitivity(data, 10)
The sensitivity value of the selected data nodes is set
to 10. Here descendantOf is a built-in query predicate that
returns all nodes reachable from a given start node.
As an another example, the predicate
for all (data wgb process)
where (process.classification > “conf” in classifications)
setSensitivity(data, 9)
binds variables data and process to pairs of nodes d,
p such that genBy(d, p) and where the classification value
p.classification of p (a property of the node) is greater than
“conf”. This requires an ordered set of classification la-
bels to be declared in a user-defined classifications
list. During the first step, the tool evaluates the policy
rules, resulting in the annotation of the selected nodes
with sensitivity values.
This model operates on the same principle as the
Bell-LaPadula security model. Each known receiver of
a graph is pre-assigned a clearance level. This is deter-
mined by factors outside the scope of the tool, e.g. how
much a receiver is trusted to the provenance owner. In
the second step, node sensitivities are compared to the
clearance level cl of the receiver, and Vgr is defined as
the set of nodes whose sensitivity is lower than cl.
The rationale for these two steps is that sensitivity
can be defined largely independently of the specific
receiver, while the exact level of abstraction is relative
to a receiver, who in this case is represented simply by
a clearance level.
13
pclos(Vgr,V) =
[
vi,vj∈Vgr
Vij
extend(Vgr,G, t) = Vgr ∪{v′ | (v, v′) ∈ E ∧ v ∈ Vgr ∧ type(v′) = t)}
∪ {v | (v′, v) ∈ E ∧ v ∈ Vgr ∧ type(v′) = t)}
replace(Vgr, vnew,G) = (V′,E′),where ϑ′out(V
′
gr) = {v t←− vnew | v t←− v′ ∈ ϑout(V′gr) ∧ ((t = wat ∧ type(vnew) = En)∨
(t = waw ∧ type(vnew) = Act)∨
(t 6= wat ∧ t 6= waw))}
ϑ′in(V
′
gr) = {vnew t←− v | v′ t←− v ∈ ϑin(V′gr) ∧ ((t = abo ∧ type(vnew) = Ag) ∨ t 6= abo)}
V′ = V \ Vgr ∪ {vnew}
E′ = E \ (ϑout(Vgr) ∪ ϑin(Vgr) ∪ ϑint(Vgr)) ∪ ϑ′out(Vgr) ∪ ϑ′in(Vgr)
remIsolated(V,E)where = (V′,E′)
isolated(G) = {v ∈ V | type(v) = Ag ∧ @v′ ∈ V.((v′, v) ∈ E ∨ (v, v′) ∈ E)}
V′ = V \ isolated(G)
E′ = E
Group(G,Vgr, vnew, t) = remIsolated(replace(extend(pclos(Vgr,V),V, t), vnew,G))
TABLE 1
Functional summary of the grouping algorithm.
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